Castan Centre for Human Rights Law

"SELF-DETERMINATION IN AN AGE OF INTERVENTION"

Anne Orford

DRAFT PAPER

The right to self-determination is one of the most compelling and contested ideas in modern international law. In legal debates about the status and the meaning of this right, we see expressed modernist fantasies about the desirability, and the dangerousness, of national identity, territory, political community and autonomy. For international lawyers, attempts to find a way of enshrining this right in doctrine have tested our capacity for creativity and our idealism about the place of law in international relations.

In this paper, I an going to focus on the meaning of self-determination in an age of humanitarian intervention. In particular, I want to consider the extent to which two such military interventions conducted in the name of human rights and democracy have led to self-determination for the people in the states concerned. The two cases I will focus on involve Bosnia-Herzegovina and East Timor, both post-conflict societies in which the international community has adopted the role of territorial administrator following intervention.

The idea that the international community has a legitimate role as administrator of post-conflict territories has gained increasing acceptance at the international level. Indeed, in light of the nature of international supervision of reconstruction in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and East Timor, it seems almost unremarkable that the government of Afghanistan is being 'freely determined' by its people in Bonn, while the World Bank, the UNDP and the ADB co-host a meeting in Islamabad to decide how to transform Afghanistan into a market economy. These developments in international relations flow from a new faith in the international community as a benign administrator. It is this idea I want to examine using a human rights framework.

First, I'll briefly sketch some of the relevant features of the content of the right of self-determination.

Second, I'll explore the nature of post-conflict reconstruction in the aftermath of humanitarian intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina and East Timor.

Third, I'll conclude by asking whether the right of self-determination has anything to offer us as a framework for thinking about post-conflict reconstruction in this very pragmatic age.

1. A word about the content of self-determination

Let me start by saying two things about the right of self-determination as part of international law.

First, there is no longer any question that such a right exists. Indeed, it is now so firmly established and widely recognized in international conventions that the ICJ has accepted that it is one of the essential principles of international law, and that it creates obligations with an erga omnes character, that is obligations that are owed to all members of the international community.1

But secondly, and paradoxically, its meaning is said to be uncertain, both in terms of who are the bearers of the right, and in terms of its content.2 The reason for this is partly political - the right of self-determination is almost always appealed to at times of great upheaval and trauma. It has been difficult to settle its meaning, precisely because it is such a fiercely contested concept whenever it is invoked.3

However, having said that the meaning of self-determination is, in important respects, an open question, there is a degree to which the content of the right is settled under international law. Larissa Behrendt's presentation this morning showed the spectrum of rights included within this concept. I want to outline three elements of that settled meaning for the purposes of my analysis.

First, what agreement is there about the bearers of the right? The right of self-determination applies without any question to those territories that were characterised as mandate territories under the League of Nations, and non-self-governing territories or trust territories under the UN Charter. These include Palestine and East Timor, two territories where claims to statehood continued to be at issue for most of the twentieth century. In addition, the application of the right of self-determination during the process of formal decolonization after World War 2 means that the right now includes more generally the right of a people to be free from colonial and alien control.

Second, as Catriona Drew has argued persuasively in a recent article on East Timor, the right of self-determination can be understood as involving both a right to a process, and a right to substantive control over territory and resources. Drew argues that in recent times there has been much attention paid to the process aspects of the right - - that is, 'the right of a people to a free choice over its political and territorial destiny'.4

Yet equally important is the substantive aspect of self-determination - a people's right to control over its territory and resources. This aspect of the right is clearly illustrated in the common Articles 1 of the ICCPR and ISCESCR. For example, Paragraph 1 provides that by virtue of the right of self-determination, all peoples 'freely pursue their economic ... development'. Paragraph 2 provides:

All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources ... In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.5

As Drew argues:

[I]mplicit in any recognition of a people's right to self-determination is recognition of the legitimacy of that people's claim to a particular territory and/or set of resources ... To confer on a people a right of "free
choice" in the absence of a more substantive entitlement - to territory, natural resources etc - would simply be meaningless .6

Finally, given the existence of a right in these terms, does the international community have a duty to intervene to help those seeking to exercise their right of self-determination? While to date, there is little to support that notion, we did see during the 1990s the growth of support within mainstream international law circles for the idea that force can legitimately be used as a response to humanitarian or self-determination issues, such as those in the Balkans and East Timor.

An early post-Cold War example of this trend was the response to the Security Council-authorised intervention in Haiti to reinstate the democratically-elected Aristide government.7 That action was interpreted by commentators such as Fernando Téson as an 'important precedent supporting the legitimacy both of an international principle of democratic rule and of collective humanitarian intervention'.8 Madeleine Albright, while still US Ambassador to the UN, suggested that the intervention in Haiti involved 'the effort to place the law on the side of the people of Haiti for perhaps the first time in that nation's history'.9 For Albright, 'UN peacekeeping contributes to a world that is ... more democratic than it would otherwise be'.10

More recently, the military interventions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and East Timor have been hailed as contributing to the realisation of democracy and self-determination in those places. For example, former US Secretary of State Warren Christopher has hailed the democratic outcome that he sees resulting from the intervention in Bosnia and the Dayton peace process.

Now the Bosnian people will have their own democratic say. This is a worthy goal in and of itself, because the only peace that can last in Bosnia is the peace that the people of the country freely choose.

Similarly, Geoffrey Robertson sees the UN intervention in East Timor as a case where the international community acted to protect the right of people to determine their own governance. Robertson argues that the future of East Timor 'is clear and optimistic: nation-building begins apace for a people the protection of whose post-plebiscite right to self-determination was the acknowledged reason for the intervention'. 11

Australia's Foreign Minister Alexander Downer has also lauded the role played by Australian troops as part of INTERFET in supporting self-determination and relieving suffering in the territory. He has said:

Australia has played a very constructive, and wholly creditable, role in the process that has led to self-determination for the people of East Timor .... We saw an opportunity to allow East Timorese to decide their own future, and we helped them realise that chance.12

I want now to ask whether humanitarian intervention has led to the realisation of self-determination, understood as the right to substantive entitlement to control over territory and resources, by focusing on the cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina and East Timor.

2. A tale of two territories

In some ways it might seem strange to attempt to compare these two cases, involving as they do very distinct issues and challenges. But what they have in common is the role the international community has adopted as territorial administrator, and what I will argue is an extraordinary erosion of political autonomy in order to construct a blueprint set of political and economic arrangements.

(a) Bosnia-Herzegovina

Let me start by sketching the role of the international community in the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina.13

The Parties to the Dayton Agreement provided that military implementation of the agreement was to be overseen by an Implementation Force (later the Stabilization Force),14 while implementation of the civilian aspects of the agreement was to be in the hands of the newly created Office of the High Representative.15

Oversight of many aspects of civilian administration was allocated to other international actors.16 For example, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe was to supervise the conduct of free, fair and democratic elections;17 the President of the European Court of Human Rights was to select three members of the Constitutional Court,18 and the International Monetary Fund was to appoint the Governor of the Central Bank.19

Perhaps the most significant international body involved in the reconstruction process in Bosnia-Herzegovina is the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), an ad hoc group of 55 countries and organisations that was formed in 1995 to sponsor and direct the peace implementation process. The Steering Board of the PIC nominates the High Representative, who is then endorsed by the Security Council. The Office of the High Representative is funded by the PIC, and the Steering Board of the PIC provides the High Representative with 'political guidance'.20 The PIC effectively decides policy for Bosnia-Herzegovina, and then directs the High Representative and other international institutions to facilitate the implementation of that policy.21 The ongoing priorities for the PIC are 'deepening economic reform and creating the conditions for self-sustaining market-driven economic growth', accelerating the return of refugees and internally displaced persons, and '(f)ostering functional and democratically accountable common institutions supported by an effective, merit-based civil service and a sound financial basis'.22

The mandate of the High Representative has been interpreted extremely broadly. Under the Dayton Agreement, the 'High Representative is the final authority in theater regarding interpretation of this Agreement on the civilian implementation of the peace settlement'.23 The High Representative has used this authority to impose legislation drafted by international actors but rejected by democratically elected state and entity bodies, to ban political parties, and to dismiss 'obstructive' elected and appointed officials. That interpretation has since been welcomed by the PIC.24

The current High Representative, Wolfgang Petritsch, has made clear that this capacity to dismiss officials, ban parties and impose legislation extends to situations where elected officials have made statements challenging the constitutionality of the Federation Government,25 and where parliamentarians refuse to pass legislation drafted by the international community implementing far-reaching economic reforms.26 The language in which the High Representative discussed the latter stalemate is instructive in terms of the limits it suggests to a commitment to respect for the right of self-determination. In an interview with Slobodna Bosna in November of this year, Petritsch stated:

It has been several months since the new authorities came to power in the Republika Srpska. Over this period we have been "pressuring" the RS Government and the Parliament including the SDS in particular, to be cooperative. ... I asked the representatives of the PIC to support me in taking more severe measures against the top RS officials because we have not seen the expected results. After this meeting, I went to Banja Luka and reiterated this to the politicians there. I think that such type of communication is really necessary - not some ambiguous political quibbling but very direct, open and intensive discussions with the relevant political actors in the RS.27

In a striking explanation of the ways in which the international community understand the meaning of democracy in a territory under administration, the High Representative explained that elected politicians do not have the right to reject legislation imposing radical economic reform.

I want to see the immediate adoption of the laws which are pending before the State Parliament. That is the first thing they have to do. If some representatives are concerned about the content of some laws, from the professional point of view, they can discuss it. However, it will not be acceptable whatsoever to reject the laws with the argument that they are unacceptable or that they do not want to deal with these laws at all. The laws concerning economic reform and development are essential, and they simply have to be passed. In case this does not happen, you can be sure that I will not hesitate to exercise my powers.28

Asked what kind of sanctions would be imposed because elected politicians had failed to produce 'the expected results' and had questioned international economic policy, the High Commissioner replied:

I will not hesitate whatsoever to exercise all the powers, as I did when I was compelled to do so in the past. I would like to remind you that to date I have removed about seventy local politicians. If the SDS compels me to do so, I will not hesitate to resort to such a measure in their case either. That is one of the options, but you know that I never mention any name in advance.29

The High Commissioner explains his motivation for treating elected representatives in these terms: 'investors, particularly those from abroad, look for security, the rule of law, and respect for human rights'.30

A formal commitment to democracy and the concept of local 'ownership' of the peace process continue to be the stated aims of international administration in Bosnia-Herzegovina.31 Yet there has been little concern expressed by the international community about the hollow nature of the democracy created under this administration.

According to David Chandler, this should not be a surprise, given that most international institutions involved in the 'transitional' administration of the state have expressed views about the 'incapacity of Balkan people to cope with democracy'.32 The OSCE has stated that 'the "political level" of Bosnian voters is "not very high"'. OHR representatives allege that 'Bosnia is a deeply sick society, ill at ease with even the most basic principles of democracy'. Perhaps most strikingly, the Senior Coordinator of the Democratisation Branch of the OSCE Mission in Bosnia has argued that 'Bosnian people are incapable of handling electoral competition'.33

As Chandler argues:

Once the capacity of Bosnian people as rational political actors is negated, there is no reason, in principle, for international administration to be seen as merely temporary or transitional, nor for democracy to be seen as preferable.34

This might be more understandable if the mistrust of the Bosnian people as rational political actors was due to a fear that minorities could again be persecuted if majoritarian rule were not in some way constrained by minority rights protections. To some extent, this fear does appear to motivate the High Representative. He appears to be making a virtue of the political dispossession of the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina, partly because the economic and institutional goals set by the international community are not negotiable, but also because the international community must distrust the capacity of the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina to govern themselves because of their violent history.

The High Representative's position finds some support in that branch of theorising about nationalism and identity, which argues along that all identity, whether personal or national, is always dependent on belligerent othering, exclusion and violence. Let us then, one response might be, make a virtue of uncertain or fluid identities, of exile, of unbounded communities.

However, as Jacqueline Rose has said:

If certainty is belligerent and panicked, you cannot in this political context just make a virtue of its opposite, not in a world where the trauma of national indefinition - lack of a nation, yearning to be a nation - is what seems historically, and so dramatically, to engender the most ruthless of psychic and political states ...

You might say that the problem is the false securing of identity; or you might argue that it is only when you lose the minimal conditions for identity that the drive begins for an identity which is falsely and dangerously secure.35

David Chandler has argued that this is precisely what is at stake in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In his view, '[t]he lack of cohering political structures has meant that Bosnian people are forced to rely on more narrow and parochial survival mechanisms, which has meant that ethnicity has maintained its wartime relevance as a political resource'.36

The way in which international rule is being conducted is 'inevitably institutionalizing inter-communal divisions, setting back any long-term settlement for the region'.37

(b) East Timor

Let me now turn briefly to the case of East Timor. I do not want to give the impression that the right of self-determination is a mantra that can solve all problems facing post-conflict societies. This would clearly be foolishly simplistic. The complexity of issues raised by a commitment to the right of a people to control over their territory and resources can be seen in the case of East Timor. There, a deeply traumatized and fiercely divided society is confronting extraordinarily complex issues relating to ownership of land.

The East Timorese have experienced multiple waves of dispossession, 'from Portugese colonisation through Japanese occupation to Indonesian invasion'.38 Most of the population were displaced in the militia violence of 1999 which followed the UN-sponsored autonomy consultation, and before that in 1975. In addition, the intervening period of Indonesian occupation was characterised by famine, displacement, transmigration and loss of lands for purposes of public interest and private development (read development by military interests or government cronies).39 As the work of Daniel Fitzpatrick has shown, the resulting competing claims to land and questions of justice are extremely complex, and have to be resolved in an institutional context in which all land title offices in East Timor were destroyed by the militia violence in 1999. This resulted in the destruction, and possibly in some cases the removal, of all land title records.40

As Fitzpatrick has argued, there will be no simple solution to resolving the enormous problems and dislocation caused by these waves of dispossession. There is clearly a role for sustained assistance from the international community. Self-determination here does not mean disengaging from the process of reconstruction. However, I want to compare the kind of subtle and careful analysis of their role that needs to be undertaken by the international community in such a situation, with the language used to describe their role by administrators at the UN and the World Bank. Those two organisations have adopted a major 'trusteeship' role, taking over responsibility for administration in East Timor during the period of transition to independence. For the purposes of today's presentation, I am going to focus particularly on the World Bank's role.

The World Bank plays a major role in the administration of East Timor. It administers the World Bank Administered Multilateral Trust Fund for East Timor, and has worked in consultation with the East Timorese and UNTAET representatives to facilitate economic development. It must be said that in the context of East Timor, the World Bank is departing from the structural adjustment model to provide funding for the building of health, education and public sector infrastructure. Yet it is nonetheless still adhering to many of the features of its boilerplate blueprint for reform. The Bank has made clear that certain familiar Bank programs and priorities are to be implemented in the management of East Timor.

For example, its plans have focused on ensuring that East Timor has limited public sector employment, openness to foreign direct investment and is quickly inserted into the global market economy, albeit as one of the poorest countries in the region.41 The World Bank determined as early as 1999 that East Timor is to have a small state, with a concomitant contracting out of many areas of service provision to the private sector, and particularly to foreign investors. George Aditjondro sees East Timor under UN and World Bank management as becoming 'a paradise for market-driven foreign investors, without considering the real need for foreign investment'.42 As Aditjondro has argued, in the short term East Timor has been overrun by foreign, mainly Australian, companies making large profits out of contracts negotiated with Interfet or UNTAET.43

For example, the hotel and tourism sector is one of the priority areas of the World Bank, and is the sector that is most '"crowded" with investors and their Timorese or Timor-based partners'.44 An early priority of development in this sector was to create accommodation for civilian UN and World Bank staff.45 The expatriate business community operating in the tourism and services sector, including the UNTAET cafeteria, pay extremely low wages to East Timorese workers, while charging reasonably high rates for accommodation and meals. Thus, says Aditjondro, 'Timorese workers are subsidising the Australian tourism business and the ... United Nations and foreign NGO community in their country. So, who is helping whom, one could ask'.46

Of this situation, Xanana Gusmao said in December 1999:

It's an insult to the misery, the suffering of our people. Our people need soap, they need food. They have primary needs ... Sometimes we felt that the Indonesian generals had no human feeling. Some businessmen also exploit the situation. It's very sad, because I cannot do anything about it. If I have a little power I can tell them to go, but I have no power.47

Aditjondro suggests that the East Timorese will be forced into honouring longer-term contracts which they had little say in negotiating, such as those those made between InterFET and Telstra, and the extremely lucrative construction contracts being awarded to Australian companies such as Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd.48

Interestingly, in some quarters, the direct degree of control exercised by the World Bank and the UN over the economic development of East Timor provides a model which is greatly to be preferred to the situation in the Balkans. For example, Allan Gerson has argued that 'East Timor presents the most concerted effort at UN-World Bank coordination, unhampered by the type of self-imposed legal restrictions hindering the Bank's engagement in Bosnia and Kosovo'. This is particularly the case as 'in the latter, Serbia nominally retains sovereignty'.49

The economic and political management being developed by these international organisations on behalf of East Timor sets the stage for the kind of limited sovereignty that Antony Anghie has analysed in his study of the operation of the mandate system of the League of Nations after World War 1.50 Under that system, territories belonging to defeated powers were placed under the control of mandate powers who were responsible for the administration of those territories and required to report back to the League concerning the well-being and development of mandate peoples. The mandate system appeared to be premised on the international community's desire to move away from colonialism.51

Anghie argues, however, that far from representing a radical departure from international law's acceptance of colonialism, the mandate system merely changed its legal form, instituting a new form of colonial power based not on political but on economic control. The neocolonial process would be overseen by an international institution, one which, like the World Bank in East Timor, saw its role as technical rather than political. Administration of a territory was to be undertaken by a disinterested body of international experts intent on ensuring the proper development and welfare of those subject to their trust.52 The policies of such institutions were seen as scientific and objective, rather than self-interested. The system as a whole, however, operated to integrate the mandate society into the international economy in a subordinate role. As a result, while those territories appeared to be freed from political control, they remained subject to the control of the parties that exercised power within the international economy.53 The resources and people of those territories were exploited just as efficiently under this new arrangement as they were under classical colonialism.

Many of the same arguments can be seen to apply in the case of East Timor. The new enthusiasm for international trusteeship evidenced there is 'linked in some equivocal way to imperial history',54 a history in which international institutions came to play an important role in limiting the meaning given to the concept of self-determination for newly sovereign states. Interestingly, while East Timor remains under UNTAET administration, it is now formally governed by the recently elected Constituent Assembly and the Second Transitional Government and its Council of Ministers. As in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the mandate system discussed by Anghie, the powers vested in the UN and exercised by the international financial institutions sit uneasily with the existence of bodies intended to represent the will of the people of East Timor.

The questions these case studies raise for the legitimacy of international law are demonstrated in a recent article by Matthias Ruffert on the administration of Kosovo and East Timor by the international community. Ruffert there struggles to find a legal category to capture the nature of the international personality of those territories under administration, given that all the existing categories that intuitively seem to fit - protectorate, trust territory - must be dismissed because of their links to colonialism.55 He explains his reluctance to adopt these categories on the basis that 'the colonial context should not inadvertently be alluded to', despite his recognition that '[e]ven if there are traces of self-determination, particularly in East Timor, the power of final decision remains with the UN-administration in all areas of government'.56 For Ruffert, there is 'without any doubt' no colonising impulse at work here - both because 'the special status of both territories is temporary' and because of 'the benevolent character of international administration'.57

The colonial character of the categories to which Ruffert is drawn illustrates for me precisely what is at stake for international law in the post-conflict reconstruction process. The narrative of humanitarian intervention operates to construct a sense of the 'benevolent character of international administration'. Participation in this narrative limits our understanding of what is taking place in those territories.

3. The promise of self-determination

This overview suggests that there is little promise of the realisation of self-determination in Bosnia-Herzegovina or East Timor in the short term. In fact, the language used by international administrators suggests little commitment to a meaningful process of self-determination in those territories. Reading the texts of post-conflict reconstruction reveals the dream of a world in which any national or indigenous differences will be swept away by the international community in its march towards standardized regimes designed to make foreign investors feel secure. As with classical colonialism, the threatening underside of this dream of reconstruction is that in its name, local or indigenous communities and cultures are destroyed, resources and people are exploited, resistance is quashed and conflict is intensified

I have offered a somewhat bleak reading of the lack of autonomy currently experienced by those subject to post-conflict reconstruction. I want now to conclude by considering the possibilities generated by the use of human rights as a foundation for the legitimacy of the processes of intervention and reconstruction.

What energy does an idea like the right to self-determination have left in such a climate? Can it serve as a basis for responding to the issues I have raised about Bosnia-Herzegovina and East Timor?58

My cautious answer is yes.

It is not possible for international administrators or intervening states to contain altogether the meanings that are made of intervention, particularly where its legitimacy is based on appeals to human rights and democratic governance. Such appeals, and responses to them, always threaten to escape the capacity of authorities to shape their meaning.

For Costas Douzinas, the human rights tradition, when free of capture by powerful states, constitutes a form of rebel philosophy based on the 'common determination to proclaim and thus bring into being new types of entitlement and forms of existence against received wisdom and the law'.59 It is this aspect of human rights discourse that proves so difficult to contain once unleashed, the moment of uncertainty promised by any reference to the revolutionary heritage of human rights. No state or international organization can completely control or predict the direction that will be taken by a community that is energized by the call to overturn the 'received wisdom and the law'.

Similarly, Diane Orentlicher has argued that it was impossible to contain the mobilizing power of the concept of self-determination in the period following World War 2.60 Self-determination was to become a banner for the decolonization movement in those years. I would suggest it is equally impossible to contain its mobilizing power today. As Larissa argued powerfully this morning, international concepts can take on new meanings as part of struggles domestically. That is the promise of the appeal to self-determination.

Much has been risked in the name of self-determination as process, in the Balkans and in East Timor, yet to date there has been no granting of the right to control over territory and resources to those peoples. Attention to that aspect of the right of self-determination undermines the justifications for the current forms of control over the territory and people of Bosnia-Herzegovina and East Timor by international administrators.

As human rights lawyers we are well placed to attempt to ensure that the legitimacy of the actions of the international community depends on protection and promotion of the right of self-determination in its entirety. Such arguments may help found the demand for a renewed commitment to the right of all peoples to live free from political domination and from economic exploitation.
1 Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v Australia), ICJ Reports (1995) 103.
2 Catriona Drew, 'The East Timor Story: International Law on Trial' (2001) 12 European Journal of International Law 627, 658.
3 James Crawford, 'The Right of Self-Determination in International Law: Its Development and Future' in Philip Alston (ed), Peoples' Rights (2001), 7-67, 38.
4 Drew, above n2, 663.
5 ICCPR, Article 1; ICESCR, Article 1.
6 Drew, above n2, 663.
7 Security Council Resolution 940 determined that the 'illegal de facto regime' in Haiti had failed to comply with previous Security Council resolutions, expressed its concern at the regime's 'systematic violation of civil liberties' and authorised member states 'to form a multinational force [and] ... to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership'. SC Res 940 (1994), UN SCOR 49th Sess, 3413 mtg, UN Doc S/RES/940 (1994).
8 Fernando R Téson, 'Collective Humanitarian Intervention' (1996) 17 Michigan Journal of International Law 323, 355.
9 Ambassador Madeleine K Albright, 'International Law Approaches the Twenty-First Century: A US Perspective on Enforcement' (1995) 18 Fordham International Law Journal 1595, 1603.
10 Ibid, 1599.
11 Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity (1999) 434.
12 Alexander Downer, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 'East Timor: The Way Ahead', speech given to the Rotary Club of Sydney, 30 November 1999.
13 The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with Annexes, 1995, reprinted at (1996) 35 International Legal Materials 75 [Dayton Agreement].
14 Ibid, Annex 1A inviting the Security Council to adopt a resolution which will authorize a military Implementation Force. By Resolution 1031 of 1995 the Security Council established such a force: UN Doc S/1995/1031.
15 Ibid, Annex 10.
16 Ralph Wilde, 'From Bosnia to Kosovo and East Timor: The Changing Role of the United Nations in the Administration of Territory' (2000) 6 ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law 467.
17 Dayton Agreement, above n13, Annex 3.
18 Ibid, Article VI of Annex 4.
19 Ibid, Article VII of Annex 4.
20 Office of the High Representative General Information, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/gen-info/ (accessed 12 November 2001).
21 David Chandler, 'Bosnia: Prototype of a NATO Protectorate' in Tariq Ali (ed), Masters of the Universe? NATO's Balkan Crusade (2000) 271, 272.
22 Declaration of the PIC, May 24, 2000, http://www.ohr/int/pic/ (accessed 13 November 2001).
23 Dayton Agreement, above n13, Article V of Annex X.
24 In Paragraph XI.2 of the Conclusions of the Peace Implementation Conference held in Bonn on 9 and 10 December 1997, the Peace Implementation Council 'welcomes the High Representative's intention to use his final authority in theatre' by taking measures including 'actions against persons holding public office or officials ... who are found by the High Representative to be in violation of legal commitments made under the Peace Agreement or the terms for its implementation': http://www.ohr.int/pic/ (accessed 13 November 2001).
25 See, for example, 'Decision removing Mr Ivan Djogic from his position as Chief of Cabinet, Ministry of the Interior of Canton 7, and further banning him from holding any official, elective or appointive public office', June 26 2001, http://www.ohr.int/decisions/removalssdec/ (accessed 13 November 2001).
26 'Interview: Wolfgang Petritsch, the High Representative in BiH: "What message I got across to the SDS", November 9, 2001, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressi/ (accessed 13 November 2001).
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 See Dayton Agreement, above n13, Articles 1 and 2 of Annex 4. Both the High Representative and the PIC regularly speak in terms of the need to protect and promote democracy and to enhance human rights and free speech. [provide references]. On the commitment to 'ownership' as a governing principle, see OHR General Information; Report by the High Representative to the Secretary-General of the UN, 1 November 1999.
32 David Chandler, above n21, 279.
33 Ibid, 278.
34 Ibid.
35 Jaqueline Rose, States of Fantasy (Oxford, 1996) 30-1.
36 Chandler, above n21, 277.
37 Ibid, 282.
38 Daniel Fitzpatrick, 'Land Claims in East Timor: A Preliminary Assessment' (2001) 3(2) Australian Journal of Asian Law 135.
39 Ibid, 159.
40 Ibid, 135.
41 See, for example, World Bank, Report of the Joint Assessment Mission to East Timor, 8 December 1999, 3-5, 8; World Bank East Asia and Pacific Region, Background Paper Prepared for the Information Meeting on East Timor, 29 September 1999, 2.
42 George Aditjondro, 'From Colony to Global Prize' (2000) 47 Arena Magazine 22, 32.
43 I should note here that I have been unable to date to make any progress in researching the patterns of tendering that have taken place under World Bank administration in East Timor, so I am relying here on the information provided by Aditjondro. However, many informal conversations I have had with UN staffers and local NGOs support the arguments that he makes here.
44 Aditjondro, above n42, 25.
45 Personal communication with UN staff member.
46 Aditjondro, above n42, 24.
47 Xanana Gusmao, Socialist Worker, 19 December 1999, cited in Aditjondro, above n42, 25.
48 Aditjondro, above n42, 24-26.
49 Allan Gerson, 'Peace Building: The Private Sector's Role' (2001) American Journal of International Law 102, 110 (emphasis added).
50 Antony Anghie, 'Time Present and Time Past: Globalization, International Financial Institutions, and the Third World' (2000) 32 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 243.
51 Ibid, 278.
52 Ibid, 284.
53 Ibid, 283.
54 Nathaniel Berman, 'In the Wake of Empire' (1999) 14 American University International Law Review 1521, 1526.
55 Matthias Ruffert, 'The Administration of Kosovo and East Timor by the International Community' (2001) 50 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 613, 631.
56 Ibid, 627, 629.
57 Ibid, 629.
58 These issues could equally be raised about the more indirect kinds of economic and political control that I have questioned elsewhere with respect to the policies and programmes of international economic institutions. See, for example, Anne Orford, 'Locating the International: Military and Monetary Interventions after the Cold War' (1997) 38 Harvard International Law Journal 443.
59 Costas Douzinas, The End of Human Rights (2000) 344.
60 Diane Orentlicher, 'Separation Anxiety: International Responses to Ethno-Separatist Claims' (1998) 23 Yale Journal of International Law 1, 39.